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Abstract 
Drawing on contemporary and historical discourse around UK business schools and insights 
from the sociology of scientific knowledge, we argue that business schools should be 
understood and judged, not as they typically have been, as engines of knowledge production, 
but as engines of credibility production. Credibility, we argue, is central to the attractiveness 
of business schools to students and other key stakeholders and therefore credibility, and the 
mechanisms through which credibility are maintained, should be at the center of strategic 
thinking within business schools. We argue that over-reliance on funding from corporate 
sources can have profound consequences for the ability of schools to continue to produce 





In terms of growth, research output and reputation, UK business schools have been one of the 
great success stories of Higher Education. Although there were no business schools in 1965 
there are now 138. One in five of all arts, humanities and social science undergraduates 
(AHSS) study in business schools, along with around a third of all post-graduates (HEFCE 
data 2011). Business schools earn around £2 billion annually for the UK economy. 
Individually, business schools’ contribution to their regional economies can range up to 
around the £100 million mark through spin-outs, improved skills and raised productivity 
(Cooke and Galt, 2010).  
 
Despite their success, UK business schools find themselves in an increasingly difficult 
environment (Starkey and Tiratsoo, 2007; PA Consulting, 2013). Schools in the UK are 
subject to a continuing shortage of qualified staff (Starkey and Tiratsoo, 2007), dwindling 
income from investments and slackening student demand, both in the UK and in key 
international markets (UKK, 2013). Competition for students is increasing from newly 
emerging private schools and credible well-priced international providers (PA Consulting, 
2013; Thomas et al. 2013), while at the same time the UK Visas and Immigration Agency is 
targeting international students as a means to reduce immigration. Students are also 
demanding more in return for their fees (Thomas, et al., 2013a). National research budget 
growth has stalled, with an increasing proportion of what remains being re-directed toward 
Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics or 'STEM' subjects (Thorpe and 
Rawlinson, 2013). All aspects of the UK Universities sector has been subject to pressure to 
seek cost savings in the context of UK government austerity measures (Diamond Report, 
2015; Blackmore, 2016). 
 
Given the structural pressure on schools, Thomas et al. (2013) have even suggested that some 
business schools may not survive. With no government restrictions on student numbers, there 
is already potential for more prestigious schools to expand into the traditional market 
segments of those below them and, indirectly, to close them down. Some commentators have 




even suggested that the scene is set for a potential ‘race to the bottom’ for schools without the 
genuine capacity to deliver on their present claims to excellence (Thomas, et al. 2013b; 
Starkey and Lejune, 2014).  
 
Given reduced funding from governmental sources and increased competition in student 
recruitment, it is timely that this special issue asks what the effects of a growth in dependence 
on external research funding and, in particular, funding direct from corporates, which is 
likely to increase, might have on business schools. What we suggest in this article is that 
through a clearer understanding of precisely how business schools survive and prosper, we 
can better predict what effects a shift toward more corporate and private funding might have.  
 
Our argument here, drawing on Latour and Woolgar's (1979) concept of the 'cycle of 
credibility' in scientific knowledge production, is to suggest that business schools must also 
attend carefully to the cycle of credibility. We argue that over-reliance on a particular source 
of funding risks degrading the embodied competencies needed to generate that credibility in 
the future. We argue that this way of thinking about business school strategy offers a clear 
and unambiguous way of analyzing the likely success of any given strategy – including the 
decision to focus on a specific form of income. 
 
The article proceeds by outlining the main debates about business school knowledge and 
teaching that have followed business schools since the 1950s. Commentators have variously 
criticized business schools for being too close to business, too close to academia, too distant 
from society and as serving none effectively or indeed, at times, ethically. This is followed by 
consideration of the similarly extensive commentary on business school strategy. This 
literature is not entirely immune from questions of where business schools should focus their 
efforts or which stakeholders they should serve and how, but its main concern is with the 
prosperity of business schools, rather than their ethics per se. This aspect of the discussion 
draws on a range of work, but also includes that directly involving the authors conducted for 
the Advance Institute of Management and reported three AIM reports (Ivory et al. 2005; 2006 
and 2007). This research was informed by data gathering exercises involving the deans 
attending three annual Association of Business Schools Dean's conferences and 
supplemented by interviews with 15 Deans. In part, this paper is a re-interpretation of the 
three reports produced for AIM, which do not focus on 'credibility' and of the interview 




Literature review: what's the problem? 
 
In this section, we draw on commentary from on business schools in the US and the UK. 
Much of the literature focuses on business education in the US, but many of the criticisms are 
also applicable in Britain, which in many respects has mirrored an American approach to 
educating managers (Engwall and Zamagni, 1998; Gourvish and Tiratsoo, 1998; Amdam, 
1996; Locke, 1996, 1989). We deal with teaching and research separately. 
 
Teaching in British business schools has been regularly criticized for its lack of relevance to 
the business community (National Economic Development Office, 1970, 1972; Griffiths and 
Murray, 1985; Brown et al., 1996). In the UK, business schools, as originally conceived, 
were never intended to be 'academic' institutions but rather their role was seen by policy 
makers as being to provide post-graduate management education that would help halt 




Britain's industrial decline (Spender, 2000; Bennis and O’Toole, 2005). However, by the 
1980s some critics felt that business schools had effectively been ‘captured’ by universities, 
that the study of management had been turned into an academic discipline and that the 
original intention that business education should primarily serve as a means of improving 
management competence, and by extension British economic performance, was being 
forgotten (Griffiths and Murray, 1985; Brown et al., 1996).  
 
In the US, concerns around teaching have focused on its lack of academic rigor. Two key US 
reports, Gordon and Howell (1959) and Pierson (1959) were commissioned to report on 
business and management teaching. Gordon and Howell (1959), in particular, regarded 
businesses schools in the US, as a consequence of their then close proximity to business, as 
unfocused and second rate – as attracting poor students, non-academic staff and of failing to 
advance theory. “Production management courses are often the repository of some of the 
most inappropriate and intellectually stultifying materials to be found in the business 
curriculum. Not only do many faculty members have little respect for such courses, but 
students in a number of schools complained” (Gordon and Howell, 1959, p. 190, quoted in 
Koskela, 2017). Teaching, it was feared, was being left to 'untrained quacks’ (Economist, 
2009). The primary concern was that US business schools lacked the respect of more 
established theory-driven fields within academe and that they failed to address broader 
business and related societal and economic questions in their teaching (Gordon and Howell, 
1959). Gordon and Howell favored a move away from practice-focused teaching and an 
emphasis instead on strategy, ethics, the arts and sciences. Though, as Koskela notes, it is 
difficult not to see criticisms around what is taught as closely bound up in what it is that 
academics themselves want to research.  
 
More recently, MBA programs in the UK and US business school's most practice-facing 
teaching programs, have also come under fire. They have been criticized for failing to instill 
leadership qualities and to teach only watered-down and uncritical versions of established 
management theory (Mintzberg, 2004; Mintzberg, Simons and Basu, 2002; Ghoshal, 2005; 
Parker, 2018). At the same time, there has been considerable discussion about the utility and 
value of MBAs (Locke, 1996, 1998; Bennis and O’Toole, 2005; Mintzberg, 2004; Mintzberg, 
Simons and Basau, 2002; Pfeffer and Fong, 2002; Rayment and Smith, 2013) and of the 
ethical values embodied in MBAs (Goshal, 2005). Alongside claims that MBAs fail to teach 
knowledge that is of career value to students they have simultaneously been implicated in 
producing MBA's that have helped drive poor ethical standards in business. In 1991, the 
Economist carried an article complaining that MBA graduates were “critters with lopsided 
brains, icy hearts, and shrunken souls” (Economist, 1991, quoted in Locke, 1998). It is 
interesting to note that Gordon and Howell shared this concern in 1959. 
 
Research conducted within business schools has also been the subject of considerable hand-
wringing. On the one hand, it has been argued that much of the research conducted in 
business schools, while empirically and methodologically rigorous, has little or no direct 
relevance for practicing managers (Bennis and O’Toole, 2005; Koskela, 2017). Koskela 
(2017) in particular has expressed concern that business schools have focused on opaque and 
'introspective quantitative theory' rather than the concerns of practicing managers (see also 
Ivory, 2017). On the other hand, concerns have also been expressed that schools have become 
too close to business and in so doing have given up their critical perspective (Crainer and 
Dearlove, 1998).  
 




Parker (2018) has echoed these concerns recently, referring scathingly to 'paint by numbers' 
academic output from UK business schools. His concern reflects a general sense that UK 
business schools have failed to fully achieve acceptance into academe and that rather than 
being captured by academe, they have been captured by an obsession with publication 
metrics. Business schools, it has also been observed, have never developed a consistent 
rigorous, stable body of knowledge like those in the fields of medicine or engineering 
(Koskela, 2017; Pfeffer, 1993). Koskela's concern is with the failure to develop a body of a 
consistent body of knowledge that could serve as a basis for management training, however 
Pfeffer's concern is more in line with that of Howell and Gordon (1959), the still pressing 
issue of academic 'prestige' (Pfeffer, 1993). As Pfeffer observes, a lack of a shared theoretic 
paradigm reduces the prestige and credibility of the knowledge produced by a discipline, 
which in turn reduces the ability of that discipline to develop the 'political clout' needed to 
leverage support and funding either internally from their host university, or externally with 
respect to government and other funding. Such disciplines also struggle to manage their own 
affairs, he notes, such as setting the criteria for promotion in that field. It should be noted 
that, political clout aside, other commentators have suggested that business schools 
themselves are academically healthy and dynamic precisely because they did not develop 
such a theoretic paradigm, and so remain flexible and eclectic enough to accommodate a 
range of multiple and even conflicting theoretic positions (e.g. Ivory, 2017). This eclectic and 
even conflicted teaching environment, he argues, provides a basis for teaching well suited to 
the complex, variable and emergent nature of the organization landscape in which students 
will eventually find themselves.    
 
As Ivory et al. (2006) note, while there is little consistency in criticisms toward business 
schools this should not be surprising given the historical context within which schools 
emerged. Having said this, it seems paradoxical that the critical literature has accused 
business schools of being both irrelevant to business and at the same time economically 
damaging and of being both too academic and yet also too uncritical.  
 
Some of the (conflicting) themes are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Conflicting themes in the debate about business schools 
  
Claim Counter-claim 
Business school research is too abstract 
and irrelevant to the needs of practicing 
managers. 
Not enough business school research is 
grounded in the methodological rigor of 
the social sciences, it is often too case 
based and discursive. 
Business school teaching is too 
theoretical, and not sufficiently focused 
on problems that managers actually face. 
Business school teaching is too ‘customer 
focused’ and not sufficiently distant from, 
and critical of, management practice. 




MBAs, and business degrees generally, 
do not produce well rounded managers 
with leadership qualities. 
MBAs are, or for a long time were, seen 
as a passport to career progression and 
greater earning power. 
Business education has made almost no 
impression on practicing managers, and 
has failed to impact business 
performance. 
Business schools are partly culpable for 
recent corporate scandals, and therefore 
have had a negative impact on business 
performance. 
There are too many business schools. 
Many of those taking degrees in 
management are unlikely to get much 
benefit from their studies.  
There are not enough business schools. 
UK firms simply cannot rely on the 
University sector to supply the training / 
education that their managers need.  
Reproduced from Ivory et al. (2006).  
 
Business schools in UK have been the subject of controversy and the uneasy relationship 
between business research and the academy has been an ongoing concern (Tiratsoo, 1998b; 
Thomas et al., 2013; Thomas, and Wilson, 2013). The creation of the first schools was in 
many respects an uneasy compromise, which, as even their proponents recognized, had 
serious weaknesses (Tiratsoo, 1998a, 1998b; Brown et al., 1996; Griffiths and Murray, 1985). 
What we can take from these criticisms, however, is a more general point. That business 
schools comprise a complex set of relations, tensions and vulnerabilities. Concerns with 
academic respectability (both for the school and the individual academic) are in tension with 
concerns about the application of knowledge to practice. The challenge for schools is to offer 
teaching and research that carries prestige (measured in academic rigor) and yet also offer 
teaching and research that is practice-oriented. Critically these tensions, as we will go on to 
suggest, can quickly threaten the stability and viability of a business school if not carefully 
managed.    
 
 
Business school strategy. 
 
Another more recent stream of commentary in the literature has been less concerned with 
which stakeholders that business schools are, or should, be serving and far more with 
pressing strategic issues for business schools. There has been much commentary from 
consultancies, industry commentators and sector bodies as to what constitutes good business 
school strategy (e.g. Cooke and Gault, 2010; Thomas et al. 2013; PA Consulting, 2013; 
Lorange, 2013; Ivory et al., 2006, 2007, 2008). An industry has grown up around offering 
business school's strategic advice and has highlighted such strategic directions for business 
schools as clear differentiation, stronger customer-focus, better business engagement and 
demonstrable economic impact. There have been increasing calls for business schools to 
differentiate themselves by specializing in particular market segments (Lorange, 2013 and 
PA Consulting, 2013) and to focus on branding (Davies, 2012). 
 
One key strategic requirement of all business schools, according to Goodall (2009), is the 
ability to attract and retain the right staff. As Goodall (2009) stresses, quoting one Dean from 
her study of successful international business schools: “Everything in a university flows from 
the academic value of faculty. My priority was to ensure that [the school] attracted and 




retained the best academics”. Blackmore (2016) notes Vice Chancellors in the UK sharing 
the same concern and that efficiency drives have threatened the retention of key acdemics. 
Our research with AIM found similar concerns across the spectrum of provision in the UK in 
our interviews with Deans. Deans recognized that good staff (by which they meant primarily 
those with strong research capabilities) underpinned both research and teaching quality. One 
Dean, of a top ranked UK school argued that: ‘it is because you are a good researcher that 
you become a good teacher'. This view was commonly expressed, and it was clear that Deans 
of prestigious schools were, above all, looking to recruit academic researchers. ‘I look for 
people who have an identity as a researcher’ one told us, ‘this leads to confidence in crossing 
boundaries.’ Deans of the top ranked schools also reflected on how they could maintain their 
positions within elite US and European business school recruitment networks, while Deans of 
the schools just below them in the rankings planned how they might break into those 
networks. Further down the rankings, amongst business schools keen to be research-focused, 
but perhaps less so, Deans sought to protect 'research stars' from excessive teaching-loads by 
building capability around islands of demonstrable excellence and bemoaned the loss of staff 
to more prestigious or better paying regional competitors. This was not true for all schools 
and those measuring less well in research rankings, we found, may well decide that research 
was not a route they were able to take.  As one dean put it: "we have a strong teaching and 
learning agenda which drives what is expected of the staff…we also research, but that is one 
line in the recruitment criteria". 
 
As regards differentiation, research by the Advanced Institute of Management (Ivory et al. 
2006) also identified the following strategic choices facing schools: the type of research focus 
(supporting local firms or tackling big social science questions); the reputation the school 
wanted to develop (e.g. as regionally or internationally influential or as teaching or research-
led); the teaching focus (from business experienced MBAs to inexperienced undergraduates; 
the volume of teaching undertaken; the sort of margin they hope to extract from teaching; and 
their function as an institution in terms generating national prestige or widening participation.  
 
Business schools can also be differentiated by the style of 'knowledge' which they generate 
and disseminate (Starkey and Francis, 2005). Building on this work, Ivory et al. (2006, 2007) 
identified four strategic knowledge-based categories of school: social science driven schools, 
liberal arts schools, professional schools and knowledge economy schools. These categories 
were based on modes of knowledge production and teaching/research focus in accordance 
with the degree to which schools tend toward one form of knowledge output or another 
(Ivory et al. 2006). The social science model is defined by its contribution to academic social 
science knowledge and debate. The principle stakeholders for this type of activity would be 
other academics in business schools and other university constituencies. Excellence can be 
measured by the UK's Research Excellence Framework and tends to indicate research-
intensive schools. Teaching is across the range from undergraduates to postgraduates but a 
high entry-tariff is typical. The liberal arts model orients towards the fundamentals of 
knowledge, self-knowledge, wisdom, leadership and art and to the practice and application of 
these factors in both teaching and research. These schools tend to be more ‘critical’ in their 
approach to knowledge and business and are also highly research-intensive. Recent history in 
the UK suggests these schools are under considerable pressure, from their own leadership, to 
move away from this focus (Parker, 2018). The third model, the professional school, focuses 
on the improvement of management practice and the training of a professional management 
cadre. It conceives of a business school as akin to schools of medicine, dentistry and law 
(Bennis and O’Toole 2005) and reflects a focus on skills development and case-study 
learning. Schools in this mold tend to focus on low-volume, high-value postgraduates. They 




are teaching-focused, but are also most typically highly-research intensive. The final model 
of activity for business schools is that of close connectivity with the knowledge economy. 
These schools have an engagement focus and seek to develop knowledge with commercial 
‘value’ in conjunction with other, often regional, organizations. These schools tend to be non-
research intensive and focus on under-graduate teaching. Many of these latter schools have 
emerged, in the UK, from regional polytechnics.  
 
Business schools in the UK, it should be noted, also face a battery of government and 
independent measures that help potential customers assess the 'quality' of the institution. The 
Research Excellence Framework (REF), the Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF), student 
employment figures, published staff-student ratios, levels and sources of research income 
(which are publically available) and the National Student Survey all feed into ranked lists, 
such as the Financial Times world-ranking and the Guardian Universities list. Rankings are 
an unavoidable ‘fact of life’ for business schools (Gioia and Corely, 2002) but they are also, 
Gioia and Corely concede, a good “…surrogate index sound-bite of programme quality” (p. 
108). Though as Parker's (2018) observations imply, these metrics also seem to be enforcing 
a strategic drift away from both business and academe and toward a more mindless 'following 
the numbers' strategy that serves neither.  
 
 
Discussion - business schools and the cycle of credibility 
 
Taken together, the need to find a knowledge space with which it is possible to excel, the 
need to retain appropriate if not excellent staff, the need to maintain levels of income (not 
least to service the increasing estate costs besetting all UK Universities as they vie for 
students (see also Parker 2018 on this subject) and the need to do well in the various national 
and international 'rankings', poses considerable strategic challenges to business schools. The 
story of Manchester Business School (MBS) is perhaps revealing in this regard, at least with 
respect to how quickly things can go wrong. The founding of the London and Manchester 
business schools in the 1960s was envisaged as a partnership between the universities and 
business. The new schools built at the time were modelled, to a considerable extent, on the 
US system with an emphasis on postgraduate MBA degrees taught using case study methods. 
From its inception, MBS had remained committed to the principle that half its income should 
be derived from business sources (primarily the provision of post-experience courses for 
practicing managers). In order to maintain this balance, and to avert a looming financial crisis 
in the 1970s, MBS focused resources on developing what they called Joint Development 
Activity (JDA) courses, in which academics and managers from a particular company worked 
together on specific business problems. The courses proved popular with business clients, 
and became an important source of revenue for the school. They were time consuming for the 
staff involved, however, and while JDAs helped MBS improve its financial position, in doing 
so levels of research funding were significantly reduced and numbers of research assistants 
slashed. By 1983 concerns about the academic credibility of the work being conducted at 
MBS was under question and this led to the removal of its director and his successors set 
about implementing a strategy to refocus attention on academic research (Wilson, 1992, 
1996). The great success of MBS today stands testament to that strategy.  
 
Choosing, strategically, to go down a knowledge-economy route, supporting local business 
and seeking non-academic funding for doing so, is consequently tantamount to a slow 
suicide. It is a paradox that potential MBAs, while seeking a practice-facing education, will 
pay higher fees to attend an institution that has demonstrable academic prestige, but that is 




how the market works. Brand is a complex and under theorized issue for business schools. 
Arguably, business schools can be thought of as what Tether and Hipp (2000) have referred 
to as knowledge-intensive service providers. That is, they offer both professional, tailored 
knowledge-services (research, MBA teaching contracts) sometimes alongside mass-
customized services (e.g. in most cases, undergraduate and post-graduate education). 
However, because the value of knowledge-based services is hard for clients to determine in 
advance ‘trust’ must precede any exchange (Roberts et al., 2000). It is for this reason that 
perceived brand is critical to the sale of knowledge-intensive services like education and 
indeed, research. For MBA's, the best way to judge the likely quality of the service (or at 
least the value of the certification associated with it) is by via the credible and universal 
measures of prestige used by others to judge it, primarily, in the UK, the REF rankings. 
Consequently, the main driver of perceived brand quality in the UK, and a proxy measure of 
the quality of all of its services, is academic output. 
 
It follows, and without losing sight of the difficulties that MBS ran into, that business schools 
have a delicate balancing act to perform which involves recruiting and retaining the staff to 
generate the academic prestige required to retain or improve their position in the rankings 
while also generating the income needed to maintain the school. As shown earlier, there is 
presently tremendous pressure on business school income, particularly that from the state. 
The problem thence, is that there is income, which contributes positively to credibility 
generation and that which detracts from it. Good income pays for research time and research 
outputs, bad income turns the members of staff involved into service providers, for which 
there is limited or no knowledge output. Latour and Woolgar's (1979) concept of scientific 
knowledge production as part of a 'cycle of credibility' in useful here. They conceive of 
scientists, not as producing knowledge per se, but as producing personal credibility. As the 
cycle progresses (see figure 1.) the researcher converts grant money and equipment, through 
subsequent work, into results, scientific papers and thence credibility. This credibility gives 
access to further financial inputs and access to such things as equipment and the cycle is able 
to continue. Established credibility may also lead to a subsequent over-estimation of 
capability and quality and to attracting resources beyond that would be expected by a more 
objective assessment of capability or quality (known as the ‘Mathew effect’, Merton, 1968). 
Arguably, this effect may also favor some already prestigious business schools.  
 
 
For business schools, this cycle is occurring at the level of the individual and the level of the 
institution itself. Individual academics need to generate academic credibility if they are to be 
promoted and gain standing within their communities. Business schools are themselves in the 
same cycle, that of converting income (from students, public bodies and private companies) 
into, not just knowledgeable students of different types and research insights for different 
stakeholders, but also into the 'credibility' that will ensure access to those inputs also in the 
future (see figure 1.). as the diagram suggests, credibility allows business schools to lever 
resources from both its host university and external sources as well as attract the staff and 
students it sees as contributing to its mission. Capable staff lie at the heart of the ability to 
generate credibility, not only through creating the right knowledge outputs but also by 
ensuring access to prestigious and high-value funding.  
 







The concept of business schools as primarily engines of credibility generation makes sense of 
much of the hand-wringing over business schools over the last few decades. Gordon and 
Howell's (1959) and Pfeffer's (1993) work can be interpreted as sharing the concern that 
business schools that lacked credibility also lacked power to attract the financial and other 
inputs needed to assure their prosperity. Calls for business schools to specialize in particular 
knowledge types (Starkey and Francis, 2005) reflects the same concern, a call for business 
schools to decide which cycle of credibility they are in, i.e. which particular stakeholders they 
should be credible to. But as we have suggested, there are great dangers here. Parker's (2018) 
concerns can be interpreted in the same way, at the root of his anxiety is the concern that 
businesses schools, by entreating their staff to 'follow the numbers' and to abandon overly 
academic concerns with the liberal arts, are squandering their credibility.  
 
The cycle of credibility, if this model is correct, also makes sense of the remarkable stability 
at the top and bottom of the University rankings that can be easily observed in UK league 
tables. Based on the cycle of credibility, one might argue that the position at the top is 
stabilized though a self-reinforcing virtuous cycle of reputation, income, access to good 
students and access to high-quality staff. In a sense, good staff are themselves an input into 
the business school's credibility cycle. Entrapment at the lower end of occurs by precisely the 
opposite means – an inability to attract or retain capable research-focused staff. As Bourdieu 
(1979) observed, it is easier to succeed in the distinction game, when you start it with a strong 
hand. Life at the lower end of the rankings is also not a matter simply of operating in a 
different student market, it also means vulnerability, as we have noted, to any expansion of 
the Universities possessed of more credibility – which translates into attractiveness to 
students.  





MBS provides one example of how over emphasizing a source of funding which does not 
contribute to the cycle of credibility can quickly de-stabilize an institution. Credibility and 
the ability to attract non-business funding, good undergraduates, PhDs, funding from 
government and so forth are tightly coupled. Institutes that ignore this link do so at great risk. 
Not only is their credibility at risk but the engine which generates it, academic staff, will soon 
look elsewhere if they feel too much of their time is spent on teaching on executive courses 
and managing consultancy programs that do not have scope for producing academic outputs. 
As Scarbrough (1998) has pointed out, the idea that 'human resource' can simply be re-
purposed at will to meet strategic ends, is unrealistic, they will resist. MBS cut across the 
focus of academics on personal credibility production and in return they ousted their director. 
 
So, what does a strong school look-like in the context of this model? The AIM research 
pointed to a familiar pattern in the top-ranked schools in the UK. These schools tended to 
reduce their reliance on undergraduate income and to focus on high-value MBA teaching. 
However, while they branded themselves as business and solutions-oriented, staff 
themselves, we found, were nevertheless also publishing on highly-regarded and sometimes 
academically esoteric social science journals; the high-fees paid by MBAs buying them the 
'headroom' to do so. These schools also worked hard to ensure a flow of government-funded 
research to pay for researchers and associated professors. Consequently, while being 
outwardly oriented toward business, primarily as a means of ensuring a flow of high-fee 
paying MBA students, they also ensured that they nurtured their credibility-generating 
machinery very carefully.  
 
It follows that the question of whether more funding from private sources is likely to have 
impact on the knowledge produced by business schools is perhaps not quite the right 
question. The question is really about how that funding does or does not interfere with the 
'credibility generating' machinery that, in the long term, underpins the overall 
competitiveness of the school. Operating from a position of existing academic reputational 
strength allows relationships to be built with business funders that do not interfere with this 
machinery unduly. Where academic credibility is also low, as perhaps as it was for MBS at 
the time, then the relationship can be more problematic – draining time and resource away 
from the task of producing credibility and threatening the stability of the school. The great 
success of Manchester today, no doubt, was in breaking away from the close embrace of 
business, building their academic credibility and then using that credibility, and the other 
resources which that gives it access to, to manage such relationships from a position of 
strength. Those commentators that bemoan the failure of business schools, even those more 
regionally focused, to engage with business, do not take proper account of the need to 






This article has suggested a model of business schools based on Latour and Woolgar's (1979) 
cycle of credibility in science. In so doing we have re-thought business schools as engines of 
credibility rather than engines of knowledge production. By framing business schools as 
knowledge-intensive businesses, dependent upon the ability to generate credibility, we can 
side-step the question as to whether business schools are academic enough, or practice-facing 
enough and ask instead whether business schools produce sufficient credibility to continue to 




attract the inputs they need (be that from students, governments or business) to prosper. The 
answer to this question, for the present at least, seems to be that they do. Business schools 
have been one of the most successful segments the UK's higher-education sector. However, 
the continued ability of business schools to achieve this success remains vulnerable. Deans 
and related governing bodies perform a delicate balancing act between maintaining the 
income they need now and maintaining the 'machinery' which produces credibility and any 
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